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WHO GETS ON THE NEWS? The relation between media biases and 
different actors in news reporting on complex policy processes 
 
ABSTRACT 
Having a voice in media is important to gain power and legitimacy in policy processes. 
However, media are biased in transmitting information. Using a quantitative content 
analysis of ten years’ news reporting around water management policies in the 
Netherlands, we study how much media attention different groups of actors receive and 
how media biases relate to this attention. Executive politicians get on the news because of 
their authoritative position; less authoritative actors getting on the news is more related to 
information biases. Information biases can thus function as a form of checks and balances 
in news reporting on policy processes. 
 
Keywords: Media, media logic, governance network, official dominance, information 
biases  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much decision making takes place in governance networks, with a variety of official and 
unofficial actors involved in the policymaking processes (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Klijn, 2008). In these governance networks, there is much uncertainty and no consensus 
with regard to the formulation of policy problems and solutions (Hisschemöller and 
Hoppe, 1995; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Actors involved in 
the policy process have dissimilar interests; as a result, there are many perspectives on 
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both problems and solutions. Because these policy issues are contested, they will often be 
publicly discussed in the media (Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). In public 
administration, much attention is paid to complex policy processes, but scarcely any to 
the construction of those processes in news reports.  
News reporting is important for all actors in a governance network. Having a 
voice in the media is an important political strategy to gain power and legitimacy in 
policy processes (Tresch, 2009). Groups of actors without authoritative power resources 
in the decision-making process need media to gain power (Cobb and Elder, 1983; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Sireau and Davis, 2007; Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten, 
2010; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2011). News coverage of a citizen group’s statements, for 
instance, may change the targets and efforts of decision makers who use the news as a 
surrogate for public opinion (Entman, 2007). But officials also attempt to reinforce their 
own position by publicity, especially if they fail to realize their goals by the traditional 
means of participation and negotiation in the policy process (Tresch, 2009; Spörer-
Wagner and Marcinkowski, 2010). Moreover, governing officials need the media to 
legitimate their policy plans and decisions (Hurrelman et al., 2009). Media coverage of 
policy processes in governance networks is therefore an important study object, deserving 
more attention in public administration research. This is particularly true in times of 
increasing mediatization within present-day Western democracies, in which the media 
and their logic have become more and more important (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; 
Hjarvard, 2008; Hajer, 2009; Strömbäck and Esser, 2009; Reunanen et al., 2010).  
Media logic refers to ‘the process through which the media present and transmit 
information’ (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 10). The media are not neutral transmitters of 
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information. The process of news-making depends to a great extent on the news value 
that journalists ascribe to an event or viewpoint, and organizational pressures on 
journalists such as deadlines and economic goals. This leads to certain patterns in news 
reporting. Research in the field of (political) communication has identified two media 
bias trends: firstly, the trend of official dominance, indicating that journalists rely heavily 
on official sources in their news reporting; secondly, information biases, whereby news is 
increasingly negative (towards authorities), as well as dramatized, fragmentized and 
personalized.  
These aspects of media logic have an important influence on who will get access 
to the public and how those actors’ public images are formed (Altheide and Snow, 1979; 
Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999). To date, studies conducted on official dominance or on 
information biases mostly concern general trends in (political) news reports (Sigal, 1973; 
Gans, 1979; Shehata, 2010; Patterson, 2000) or election coverage (Tresch, 2009
1
; 
Hopmann et al., 2011; Brants and Neijens, 1998; Brants and van Praag, 2006; 
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006).
2
  In a more multifaceted setting of a complex policy process 
– where it is not all about the politicians, as in election periods, but various public, semi-
public and private actors are involved – the results might be different.  
In this article, we analyse ten years of news reporting on five comparable water 
management projects, representing cases of complex policy processes (van Buuren et al., 
2010). We are interested in how much media attention different groups of actors receive 
and how the identified media biases relate to this media attention. 
                                                 
1
 More precisely Tresch (2009) studies news reports in the context of two referenda: on a set of bilateral 
agreements with the EU and on a popular initiative “Yes to Europe.”  
2
 An important exception is Baumgartner and Jones, 2009. They discuss the biases of negativity and 
conflict in their book on policy processes.  
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We distinguish four groups of actors in our analysis. Firstly, there are governing 
officials: executive politicians such as ministers, provincial governors and aldermen. 
Secondly, there are non-governing officials, who are members of the lower house and 
from provincial and municipal councils. The third category, administrative officials, 
mostly represents the project organization. Lastly, the unofficial actors’ category mainly 
encompasses various citizen groups. These four groups of actors have different interests 
in gaining media attention, and they generally represent different perspectives on 
policies. Governing officials mainly strive to ensure that their policies attract positive 
attention, whereas unofficial actors and non-governing officials rather try to open up the 
policy process by publicly questioning these policies.  
We start this article with a theoretical elaboration, mainly by zooming in on 
official dominance and information biases in news reports. In the second section, we 
discuss our data and  methods. Thirdly, we present the results. Lastly, we discuss our 
conclusions. 
 
COMPLEX POLICY PROCESSES IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIATIZATION 
Many policy problems can be characterized as ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973; 
Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Wicked problems are ill-defined, 
and solutions to such problems rely on extensive negotiations between different actors. 
Planning problems are a good example of wicked problems, with implications for policy 
making. There is a broader participation of affected parties, directly and indirectly, in the 
policy process (Mason and Mitroff, 1981). All kinds of actors are part of the decision-
making process, such as representatives of municipalities, provinces, private enterprises 
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and interest groups. Horizontal relations between these actors replace hierarchical 
relations, resulting in governance networks (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Koppenjan and 
Klijn, 2004). Interdependencies between actors are predominant in these governance 
networks. No single actor has the final coercive power to fulfil his/her policy plans, 
because of these interdependencies (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005).  
In policy games, the actors with divergent interests, goals and perceptions pull 
and push to bring about problem formulations and policy measures (Koppenjan, 2007). 
Because little agreement exists between them with regard to the problem or the solution, 
negotiations among the actors will seldom lead to unanimous consensus. As Sorensen 
and Torfing (2005: 203) argue: ‘deliberation takes place in a context of intense power 
struggles and the presence of disagreements, conflicts and social antagonism that means 
that political decisions will often be made on the basis of a “rough consensus” where 
grievances are unavoidable, but tolerable.’  
Although no actor has the final coercive power in policy games, power 
differences do exists, due to differences in power resources such as knowledge, money or 
political position (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Koppenjan, 
2007). The ability to anticipate and mobilize media attention is another power resource in 
policy games (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Hajer, 2009; Tresch, 
2009; Spörer-Wagner and Marcinkowski, 2010; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2011). As 
discussed in the introduction, with publicity for their viewpoint, actors can strengthen 
their position in negotiations in policy processes. This power resource has become 
increasingly important in the age of mediatization (Hajer, 2009).  
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Competition over media access is, however, guided and restricted by media logic: 
the process of news-making led by the media’s aims, production routines and selection 
criteria (Tresch, 2009). This has led to certain trends in news reporting: official 
dominance and information biases in news reports. We further discuss these trends in the 
next two sections. 
           
Official dominance: News is about the powerful 
The more powerful position an actor holds, the more media attention he/she 
automatically receives. This is referred to as the incumbency bonus (Hopmann et al., 
2011) or as official dominance (Shehata, 2010). Studies dating back as far as the 1970s – 
still frequently cited – had already concluded that the majority of the news reports are 
written about officials (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). More recent studies also confirm that 
officials dominate the news (Tresch, 2009; Shehata, 2010).  
Explanations for official dominance in the news mainly include professional 
journalistic norms and efficiency aims within media businesses (Bennett, 1996; 
Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Cook, 2005; Bennett, 2009). Reliance on officials is partly 
due to the news value of officials’ behaviours and viewpoints. The newsworthiness of 
actors’ perspectives or actions is at least partially determined by the power and influence 
of those actors (Bennett, 1996; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Shehata, 2010; Hopmann et 
al., 2011). Actions of the powerful are newsworthy because what the powerful do affects 
the general public. Tresch (2009: 71) therefore argues that ‘formal power in the policy-
making process therefore easily translates into discursive power in the media, which can 
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further strengthen the political power of an actor and ultimately lead to a self-
perpetuating cycle of political influence and media coverage’. .’  
Moreover, reliance on governing officials is rooted in journalistic norms of 
objectivity and in the political obligation to provide some degree of democratic 
accountability (Bennett, 1996). Officials are seen as providing ‘factual,’ authoritative and 
legitimate information.  
In addition, governing officials are mostly very efficient news sources. 
Authorities increasingly invest in ‘selling’ their policies and managing their public 
relations (Cook, 2005; Eshuis and Klijn, 2012). Public relations practitioners make 
governmental information easily accessible to journalists (Gandy, 1982; Lieber and 
Golan, 2011). In times of intensifying pressures on journalists due to the heavy 
competition in the news market, journalist are increasingly dependent on these 
‘information subsidies’ supplied by official sources (Gandy, 1982). Consequently, many 
news reports arise in close collaboration between reporters and governing officials, and 
their media advisers. 
Whereas officials are newsworthy because of their influential position, others, 
who lack habitual access to the media, have to rely on disruptive events (Shehata, 2010) 
or other news values (Parkinson, 2006) in order to become newsworthy. Hence, one way 
for other actors to get publicity for their viewpoint is to organize events such as protests 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Terkildsen et al., 1998). This fulfils their need to get media 
coverage, but it also fulfils the media’s need for news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). 
Besides this organization of (pseudo) events and drama, using sound-bites and 
personalizing a story are other ways to attract media attention (Parkinson, 2006). The 
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information biases in the news (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009) can therefore be seen as a 
trend in news reporting that facilitates the relations between journalists and unofficial 
actors or non-governing officials. 
      
The other side: Information biases 
Wicked policy processes are either avoided by journalists or drastically reshaped to fit 
journalistic norms (Davis, 2007). Bennett (2009) describes four trends in current news 
reporting that, in his opinion, simplify complex governmental issues. He sees trends of 
personalization, dramatization, fragmentization and an authority-disorder bias, which he 
calls information biases. In addition, Patterson (2000) sees a bias towards negativity in 
the news. These five trends in the framing of news can also be found in other studies on 
media content.  
The personalization bias refers to the framing of stories in terms of human 
interest. It brings a human face or emotional angle to the presentation of an issue 
(Bennett, 2009; Patterson, 2000; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). 
The dramatization bias concerns an emphasis on crisis and conflict in stories 
rather than on continuity and harmony (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). Journalists tend 
to describe the situation at hand in terms of conflicts, with winners and losers (Brants and 
Neijens, 1998; Brants and van Praag, 2006; Hopmann et al., 2011; Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000; Strömbäck and Shehata, 2007). 
The isolation of stories from one another and from their larger context is called 
the fragmentization bias (Bennett, 2009; Iyengar and McGrady, 2007; Patterson, 2000; 
Strömbäck and Shehata, 2007; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). In this ‘episodic’ 
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framing, journalists describe issues in terms of specific events; they do not place them in 
their more general context (Iyengar and McGrady, 2007). 
The news is furthermore preoccupied with order, as journalists question whether 
authorities are capable of establishing or restoring the order (Bennett, 2009; Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000). At the same time, the media’s attitude towards authorities is shifting 
from a more favourable stance towards an attitude where the media are more suspicious 
of authorities (Bennett, 2009; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006). This bias is known as the 
authority-disorder bias. 
Lastly, the tendency of the news to be more negative in general (Patterson, 2000) 
reflects a negativity bias.   
These five information biases can be seen in two different ways. While factors of 
personification, negativity and a focus on drama and conflict are part of the classical 
news factor theory of Galtung and Ruge (1965), nowadays these news factors give rise to 
much criticism regarding the quality of news; they are seen as information biases. 
Bennett (2009: 40) introduces the information biases in his book as follows: ‘In 
particular, four characteristics of news stand out that public information in the United 
States does not always advance the cause of democracy.’ Many other prominent scholars 
also accuse journalists of making political news more spectacular and entertaining, while 
providing less substantive information (e.g. Patterson, 2000; Delli Carpini and Williams, 
2001; Davis, 2007; Bennett, 2009). This is explained in the literature by competition for 
the attention of the news consumer and – again – efficiency aims (Bennett, 2009; Davis, 
2007; Delli Carpini and Williams, 2001).  
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However, the information biases can be approached more positively as well. 
Shehata (2010: 127) claims that ‘framing politics as a game rather than focusing on 
issues, policy positions and ideologies is … a way for journalists to distance themselves 
from politicians and to impose their own “professional” lens on politics.’ Reporting on 
aspects of politics other than those promoted by politicians thus demonstrates journalistic 
independence. Schudson (2009) even argues that an unlovable press is essential for the 
functioning of democracy. The very characteristics of media logics that other scholars 
criticize – the pre-occupation with events, with conflicts, the cynism – give journalists the 
opportunity to subvert established power in the deliberative process, Schudson (2009) 
claims. Conflicts and news dramas therefore do not only ‘downplay information on 
complex policy information and the workings of government institutions’ as Bennett 
(2009: 41) states. Zooming in on citizens potentially affected by the policies shows a 
different side of the policy story. In contrast to the official dominance thesis, information 
biases might indicate that a news story is more independent of governing officials. More 
conflict, negativity and human interest in a news story can thus also be a form of checks 
and balances.  
  
Hypotheses 
On the basis of the literature discussed, we can develop some – although merely 
explorative – hypotheses on the media coverage of the complex policy processes under 
study. 
The official dominance thesis leads to the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Officials will be more often the key subjects in a news report than unofficial actors. 
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H2: Governing officials will be more often the key subjects in a news report than non-
governing officials. 
The information biases thesis leads to another three hypotheses: 
H3: The mean ranks on the information biases in news about governing officials and 
administrative officials differ significantly from the mean ranks of non-governing 
officials and unofficial actors. 
H4: The personalization bias, dramatization bias, fragmentization bias, authority-disorder 
bias and negativity bias are more often present in news about unofficial actors than in 
news about governing officials. 
H5: The personalization bias, dramatization bias, fragmentization bias, authority-disorder 
bias and negativity bias are more often present in news about non-governing officials 
than in news about governing officials. 
The data and methods we used to test these hypotheses are described in the 
following section on methodology.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data: Five water management cases  
We studied news reports on five complex water management cases in the Netherlands 
over a ten-year period. Initiative for these projects is taken by the national government or 
by provinces. The cases can be seen as representative regional water projects conducted 
in the Netherlands (van Buuren et al., 2010; Edelenbos et al., 2013). Information about 
the main issues, the policy initiator and the current state of the different cases can be 
found in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Information about the five water management cases  
Note: Based on the case studies of van Buuren et al. (2010) and Edelenbos et al. (2013) 
 
 
Water management is in all cases combined with other planning activities such as 
housing, the development of recreational areas or infrastructure. This combination of 
tasks increases the number of public and private actors involved in the decision-making 
process. Van Buuren et al. (2010) also note a more general trend of an increasing 
involvement of citizen groups, not only in water projects, but also in other public 
decision-making processes.  
Regarding the water policy measures executive and non-executive politicians 
from local, regional and national government; water boards, bureaucrats from ministries, 
provinces and municipalities; and representatives from citizen groups, private investors 
and research institutes are involved. Most actors have different interests and different 
perspectives on the project. Besides this, knowledge on the issues is limited and 
contested. For instance, conflicting opinions exist on the necessity for extra water storage 
in the areas and the amount of water that will have to be managed in the future. Van 
Buuren et al. (2010) therefore characterize these water management issues as wicked.  
 IJsseldelta-Zuid Lent Noordwaard Wieringerrandmeer Zuidplaspolder 
Time 
period 
2000–to date 1993–to date 2000–to date 1998–2009 2001–to date 
Initiator Province National 
government 
National 
government 
Province Province 
Main 
issues 
Creating a bypass for 
water storage, with 
implications for a 
railway and a motorway 
in that area, combined 
with the building of 
new dwellings and 
recreational area. 
Shifting the dikes 
for water storage, 
combined with the 
building of new 
dwellings and a 
new bridge. 
Shifting the 
dikes for water 
storage and 
stimulating 
recreational 
activities in the 
area. 
Creating a large 
lake and building 
new dwellings 
(enhancing tourism 
and creating 
economic 
incentives for the 
area). 
Redeveloping a 
polder (land 
reclaimed from the 
sea) and creating 
space for new 
dwellings, water 
storage and space 
for glass houses. 
Current 
stage 
Delayed 
implementation 
Implementation Implementation Cancelled Delayed and 
downsized 
implementation 
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News media facilitate the public debate on these projects. Moreover, media 
attention for your stance can be seen as a power resource in decision making processes. It 
is thus important to see which actors are covered in news reports on these wicked issues.  
 
Data collection 
We obtained our data from newspapers and the television. We included the regional 
media newspaper(s) of that region and five national newspapers with different political 
orientations
3
. The search in the Lexis Nexis Academic NL database
4
 concentrated on the 
period between 1 January 2000 and 1 January 2010. We used the name of the case
5
 as the 
search term.  
Reports were deemed to belong to the universe only when more than one 
paragraph
6
 was written on the relevant water management project. If the universe of 
regional news reports for one specific case comprised more than 150 items, we took a 
random sample per project.
7
 The number of national news reports exceeded that threshold 
for sampling in none of the cases. We analysed television items about the water 
management projects using the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision website 
(http://portal.beeldengeluid.nl/) and regional broadcasters’ websites. We included all 
television items in our analysis, since they were few in number. 
                                                 
3
 Algemeen Dagblad, De Telegraaf, de Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad and Trouw 
4
 Although Lexis Nexis is the most comprehensive newspaper database in the Netherlands – containing all 
national, regional and local newspapers in the country – the coverage of some newspapers with a merely 
regional character did not start until after 2000. This may have led to some biases in the sample. 
5
 IJsseldelta-Zuid, dijkteruglegging Lent, Noordwaard, Wieringerrandmeer and Zuidplaspolder. 
6
 Or when the report itself was just one paragraph and it concerned the water management project.  
7
 Between 150 and 300 reports: the sample consists of the first of every two reports (for Noordwaard and 
Wieringerrandmeer); between 300 and 450 reports: the sample consists of the first of every three reports 
(for Zuidplaspolder).  
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The total universe consisted of 1,011 news reports; after sampling the regional 
newspaper reports, we had a total sample of 566 news reports. More than 10 percent 
(13.6 per cent) of the reports come from national news media, and the rest come from 
regional media (86.4 per cent). Newspapers reported significantly more often about the 
projects than television, with, respectively, 536 (94.7 per cent) and 30 items
8
 (5.3 per 
cent).   
 
Method: Quantitative content analysis 
The unit of analysis was a news report. We used Patterson’s (2000) established coding 
scheme to typify each report regarding the information biases. We also used his 
instructions with regard to conceptualization as can be seen in Appendix 1. This scheme 
is more elaborate than those used in other studies, which have tended to focus on just a 
selection of information biases (see for instance Brants and Neijens, 1998; Brants and van 
Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Strömbäck and 
Shehata, 2007). Moreover, Patterson’s codes (2000) can be easily translated into the 
information biases described by Bennett (2009) (because Bennett builds on Patterson’s 
research). In addition, we created a coding variable for the actor who was the key subject 
of the news report. The categories of this variable (23 actors in total) were based on 
earlier case study research on these projects (van Buuren et al., 2010). We recoded this 
item into four categories for the purpose of this study, into governing officials, non-
governing officials, administrative officials and unofficial actors (see Table 2). 
                                                 
8
 However, we must remark that it is only quite recently that regional television programmes can be found 
on the Internet. The earliest item from regional television is from March 2006, and the date regional 
broadcasters started their broadcasting on the Internet may even differ per outlet. This may lead to small 
biases in the analysis.  
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Five teams of trained coders executed the coding of the news reports, with the 
help of an extensive coding instruction. We executed two tests of reliability, using 
conformity tests. Conformity of 0.90 or higher leads to a reliability score above 0.80 on 
all types of reliability measures (Wester and van Selm, 2006). First, intra-observer 
reliability (Krippendorf, 2004) was tested; the stability of the coders was on average 0.94. 
Secondly, inter-coder reliability (Krippendorf, 2004) was tested, resulting in an average 
of 0.90. Hence, we conclude that the data set can be seen as reliable: there is not much 
‘noise’ hampering accurate statistical analysis of these data.   
 
To analyse the data, we used SPSS version 20.0. Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic and the Shapiro-Wilk statistic were highly significant for the data among the four 
different groups of actors; this means that the different distributions are all non-normal. 
We therefore used non-parametric statistical methods. Instead of assuming normal 
distributions, these methods calculate the test statistics with ranked data (Conover and 
Iman, 1981). The lowest score in the data - including all groups - is given a rank of 1; the 
next lowest score is given a rank of 2, and so on . In case of similar scores, this is referred 
to as ties, average ranks are assigned. The tests are carried out on the ranks rather than the 
actual data (Conover and Iman, 1981; Field, 2009).  
We have examined significant differences between the four groups in our analysis 
with the Kruskal-Wallis test, which can be seen as a non-parametric ANOVA. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test calculates whether the mean ranks for the groups differ significantly. 
With post-hoc tests provided by SPSS 20.0 we calculate pairwise comparisons; we test 
for significant differences between the mean ranks of two groups. These post-hoc tests 
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correct for type I errors by the Dunn-Bonferroni test; they calculate an adjusted 
significance value. 
      
MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE WATER MANAGEMENT PROJECTS 
The official dominance thesis  
We firstly examine whether officials indeed dominated the news reporting on the water 
management projects. Table 2 reports the percentages of how relatively often the 
different actors were the most important actor in a news report. Per news report, only one 
of the actors could be chosen as key actor. 
Table 2: Media coverage of actors: percentages of actors as key subjects in a news 
report 
 
 
 
 
 
Officials (56.5%) 
 
 
Governing officials 
(31.6%) 
(Prime) minister 6.9% 
The state 0.4% 
Provincial governor 7.2% 
The province 1.9% 
Mayor 1.8% 
Aldermen 5.1% 
The municipality  6.4% 
Water board 1.9% 
Non-governing officials 
(13.8%) 
Member of the lower house  4.4% 
Member of the provincial council 2.7% 
Member of the municipal council 6.7% 
Administrative officials 
(11.1%) 
Administrative officials 3.0% 
Metropolitan region 0.4% 
Project organization 7.8% 
 
Unofficial actors 
(43.5%) 
 
Unofficial actors 
(43.5%) 
Inhabitants (association) 17.1% 
Farmers 6.7% 
Environmental organizations  7.1% 
Private investors 3.2% 
Research institute  3.9% 
Other 5.5% 
 
In Table 2, we see that officials are the main subject of the story in 56.5 per cent of the 
news reports, against 43.5 per cent of the news reports on unofficial actors. So, officials, 
including governing officials, non-governing officials and administrative officials, are 
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somewhat more often the key subject of a news report than unofficial actors. It seems that 
the officials indeed to some extent benefit from the newsworthiness value they 
automatically possess and the information subsidies that they provide. 
However, the contrast between the groups of officials and unofficial actors is not 
as strong as we expected, following the theoretical notions on official dominance. 
Particularly, in comparing attention on governing officials (key actors in 31.6 per cent of 
the news reports) with attention on unofficial actors (key actors in 43.5 per cent of the 
news reports), the conclusion must be nuanced. Governing officials do not really 
dominate the news among the complex water management projects under study. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the news reports do have an official as their key subject. 
Although with reservations, we can confirm the expectation stated in H1. 
Within the category of officials, we make a distinction between governing 
officials, non-governing officials and administrative officials. We see that governing 
officials are the main subject of the story in 31.6 per cent of the news reports, against 
13.8 per cent of the news reports mainly concerning non-governing actors. Governing 
officials’ actions have generally more consequences for citizens and have therefore more 
news value than actions of non-governing officials. Moreover, governing officials 
generally have more resources to invest in their communication strategies than non-
governing officials. We indeed see that governing officials are more often the most 
important actors in a news report than non-governing officials, thereby confirming 
hypothesis H2.  
 
 
 19 
The information biases thesis 
The relatively large share of news reports in which unofficial actors are the key subject 
might be related to the other trend in news reports: information biases. As discussed in 
the theoretical section, we expect unofficial actors and non-governing officials to get 
more publicity by adapting to the media’s needs. By providing dramatic events, conflict, 
critical accounts and human interest, these actors acquire more news value as well.  
In Table 3, we report the frequencies of information biases. Frequencies in bold 
show the percentages of the news reports in which the relevant information bias is clearly 
present.
9
  
Table 3: The frequencies of the biases categories 
 Categories Percentage 
Fragmentization Thematic 22.8 
Episodic 77.2 
Personalization No (or merely incidental) human interest 54.6 
Slight human interest content  21.6 
Moderate human interest content 12.7 
High human interest content 11.1 
Dramatization No conflict framing 36.0 
Some conflict framing 31.3 
Substantial level of conflict framing 32.7 
Authority-disorder 
bias 
No authority-disorder bias 50.4 
Authority-disorder bias 49.6 
Negativity bias Clearly positive/favourable/good news 
  7.1 
More positive or favourable than negative or unfavourable 
12.9 
Balanced mix between negative and positive/Neutral story, no positive 
or negative 
32.5 
More negative or unfavourable than positive or favourable 
22.6 
Clearly negative/unfavourable/bad news 
24.9 
 
From the table it is clear that  reports are often fragmentized, dramatized, include 
an authority-disorder bias and bring negative news on the project. The personalization 
bias appears less often than the other information biases. About one-third of the news 
reports are heavily dramatized (32.7 per cent), and another third are dramatized to some 
                                                 
9
 These emboldened categories were also used to calculate the variable the number of information biases. 
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extent (31.3 per cent). The authority-disorder bias can be found in almost half of the 
reports (49.6 per cent). More than three-quarters of the news reports are coded as 
episodic
10
 (77.2 per cent). Almost half of the news reports are negative towards the water 
management projects (47.5 per cent). ‘Only’ about a quarter of the news reports are 
highly or moderately personalized (23.8 per cent). It might be less likely to report on 
these merely technical water management projects with a more personal or emotional 
approach than on other policy issues.  
Table 4: The frequencies with regard to the number of information biases 
Number of information biases Percentage Number of information biases, excl. 
fragmentation bias 
Percentage 
0 4.4 0 28.1 
1 28.4 1 23.3 
2 25.3 2 23.0 
3 20.1 3 18.0 
4 17.1 4 7.6 
5 4.6 --  
 
Examining the number of information biases per news report, we see that 95.6 per 
cent include one or more information biases (see Table 4). Even excluding the 
fragmentization bias, we note that, in a large majority (71.9 per cent) of the news reports, 
one or more information biases can be found. Information biases thus definitely seem to 
shape the news reporting on these complex water management projects. 
How do these information biases relate to the different groups of actors studied in 
the previous section?  
 
 
                                                 
10
 The fragmentization bias frequencies are quite different for the five cases; this may result from different 
interpretations of Patterson’s (2000) instruction on this item, which is quite broad. We have to be careful 
with conclusions about the fragmentization item because it may not be as reliable and valid in this study as 
we would like it to be. Nevertheless, in all cases, the bias is found in more than 50 per cent of the reports. 
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The relation between different key subjects in news reports and information biases 
Firstly, we show the complete picture, comparing all four groups in Kruskal-Wallis tests. 
The presence of four of the five information biases in news reports varies significantly 
when different groups of actors are the key actor in the report. The personalization bias 
(H(3) = 56,13, p<0,001); the dramatization bias (H(3) = 47,79, p<0,001), the authority-
disorder bias (H(3) = 19,09, p<0,001) and the negativity bias (H(3) = 49,37, p<0,001) 
show significantly different mean ranks among the different groups of key subjects in the 
news reports. The fragmentization bias, however, did not show significant differences 
(H(3) = 2.20, p=0.532); we therefore did not perform pairwise comparisons concerning 
this bias.  
In the post-hoc test provided by SPSS 20.0, the mean ranks regarding the other 
four biases are compared in pairs. Fig. 1 presents the results. We adjusted the figures 
presented by SPSS to increase the clarity and readability of the figures. The numbers 
represent the mean ranks of the four groups of key subjects on the information biases in 
the Kruskal-Wallis test. For instance, with regard to the dramatization bias, ‘governing 
officials 246.02’ indicates that the average of the ranks assigned to scores within the 
group ‘governing officials as key subject’ is 246.02.  
The differences between these mean ranks are tested for significance. Solid lines 
between groups of key actors indicate significant differences between the groups 
regarding their mean rank on one of the information biases; conversely, the dashed lines 
indicate non-significant differences between the groups of actors. The mean rank of 
governing officials regarding the dramatization bias (246.02) is thus significantly 
different from the mean rank of unofficial actors (316.05).  
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Figure 1: Graphic representation of pairwise comparisons concerning four information 
biases across four groups of key subjects 
 
The governing officials and administrative officials score the lowest mean ranks 
on all information biases (except for the personalization bias, where the non-governing 
officials score a few decimals lower than the governing officials). In most of the graphics, 
these lower mean ranks can be contrasted with the higher mean ranks of unofficial actors 
Governing officials 
246.02 
Unofficial actors 
316.05 
Administrative officials 
            201.08 
Governing officials 
249.63 
Governing officials 
239.43 
Governing officials 
272.64 
Unofficial actors 
291.40 
Unofficial actors 
323.26 
Unofficial actors 
335.73 
Non-governing officials 
   328.04 
Non-governing officials 
   322.18 
Non-governing officials 
      249.29 
Administrative officials 
             228.35 
Administrative officials 
       205.56 
Administrative officials 
                 218.16 
Dramatization bias 
Authority-disorder bias  Negativity bias 
Personalization bias 
Non-governing officials 
     333.43 
            Mean ranks are significantly different    
            Mean ranks are NOT significantly different   
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and non-governing officials. Thus, most information biases are more present when news 
reports have an unofficial actor or a non-governing official as their key subject.  
The solid and dashed lines clearly show this contrast between the governing and 
administrative officials versus the non-governing officials and unofficial actors regarding 
the dramatization bias and the negativity bias. Non-governing officials or unofficial 
actors as key subjects lead to more conflict and more negativity in the news report. 
Given the line pattern of the personalization bias, we note that this bias mostly 
relates to the unofficial actors as key actors in the news report. The unofficial actors can 
in this regard clearly be contrasted with the other groups of key actors, who all score 
significantly lower mean ranks on the personalization bias.  
The authority-disorder bias shows a more complex pattern of pairwise 
comparisons. The non-governing officials have the highest mean rank on this variable; 
this differs significantly from that of the governing officials and administrative officials, 
but not from that of the unofficial actors. So far, this is comparable to what we found 
regarding the dramatization bias and the negativity bias. However, the mean rank of the 
authority-disorder bias in news reports on unofficial actors is in itself comparable to the 
mean rank of news reports on governing officials. In summary, the different results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis tests confirm that the presence of four of the five information biases vary 
to the extent that key subjects vary. We can therefore reject these null hypotheses for H3. 
The mean ranks regarding the dramatization bias, the negativity bias, the personalization 
bias and the authority-disorder bias of the different groups of key actors differ 
significantly. However, the mean rank concerning the fragmentization bias of the 
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different groups of key actors does not differ significantly; we thus retain this null 
hypothesis. 
In the next sections, we discuss more extensively the comparative analysis of the 
information biases among reports in which governing officials are key actors versus 
reports in which unofficial actors and non-governing officials are key actors. We provide 
the results of the pairwise comparisons with post-hoc tests, correcting for the type I error 
by the Dunn-Bonferroni test, and the effect sizes, to test H4 and H5 exhaustively.   
 
Governing officials versus unofficial actors as key actors in a news report 
As revealed in the previous section, news reports with unofficial actors as key subject are 
more personalized (p < 0.001, r = 0.29), more dramatized (p < 0.001, r = 0.22) and more 
negative (p < 0.001, r = 0.26) than news reports on governing officials. Stories about 
unofficial actors, mostly citizen groups, seem to have provided more conflict, more 
negativity and more human interest to the journalists. The reported effect sizes (r) 
represent all small to medium effects; they are just under the 0.3 threshold for a medium 
effect.  
In contrast, the pairwise comparison of unofficial actors and officials as key 
subject in news reports was not significant with regard to the authority-disorder bias (U = 
18,760, n.s.). In the news reports, we found governing officials also frequently 
demanding (urgent) action by their own or other governmental institutions. We presume 
that therefore no significant difference exists in the occurrence of the authority-disorder 
bias in news reports where officials or unofficial actors are key subject. 
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We can thus reject most null hypotheses belonging to H4; the personalization 
bias, dramatization bias and the negativity bias are significantly more often present in 
news on unofficial actors than in news on governing officials. However, we need to retain 
the null hypotheses that the presence of fragmentization bias and the authority-disorder 
bias is more or less similar, whether unofficial actors or governing officials are the key 
actors in the news reports.  
 
Governing officials versus non-governing officials as key actors in a news report 
The news reports on non-governing officials are more dramatized (p < 0.001, r = 0.26) 
and more negative (p < 0.001, r = 0.24) than news reports on governing officials. 
Furthermore, they more often show the authority-disorder bias (p < 0.05, r = 0.18). Non-
governing officials seem to provide more conflict and more negativity to journalists. 
Furthermore, they seem to make more demands that authorities should take action. The 
effect sizes all indicate small to medium effects. 
In contrast, the pairwise comparison did not show a significant difference 
concerning personalization bias (U = 0,337, n.s.). We did not find many news reports in 
which officials, governing or non-governing, personalize their message, or in which these 
officials are part of a human interest story.  
In sum, we can reject most null hypotheses belonging to H5; dramatization bias, 
negativity bias and authority-disorder bias are significantly more often present in news on 
non-governing officials than in news on governing officials. However, we need to retain 
the null hypothesis that the fragmentization bias and the personalization bias are similarly 
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present when non-governing officials and governing officials are key actors in news 
reports.  
Combining the results on the official dominance thesis with the results on the 
information thesis leads to the conclusion that governing officials are newsworthy 
because of their authoritative position as such; to other actors, newsworthiness is added 
by information biases. These information biases can be a result of the framing of the 
message or the organization of an event on the part of unofficial actors or non-governing 
officials. Conversely, information biases can also be the product of a more attractive or 
independent framing on the part of journalists using the perspectives of unofficial actors 
or non-governing officials. Probably, it will often be a combination of these.  
 
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION BIASES IN THE FIGHT FOR MEDIA 
ATTENTION 
Media attention is an important source of power within governance networks, especially 
in times of mediatization. Actors thus fight to attract media attention. Hence, we have 
studied how much media attention different groups of actors attract in complex policy 
processes and how media biases relate to this media attention. We have analysed official 
dominance and information biases in news reports on five water management projects in 
the Netherlands. 
We observed that official actors do receive somewhat more media attention than 
unofficial actors in the news reports; and governing officials more than non-governing 
officials. Authoritativeness thus indeed seems to be an important news value; this is in 
line with earlier research on this topic (Bennett, 1996; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; 
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Shehata, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2011). Governing officials might at the same time benefit 
from the information subsidies provided by their communication professionals. However, 
the contrast between official and unofficial actors is not as strong as we expected 
following the literature on official dominance (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tresch, 2009). 
From the comparison of relevant smaller subgroups, it even appeared that unofficial 
actors are more frequently subject of a news story than governing officials. This result 
might be partly explicable by the governance networks in which actors are organized, 
where political hierarchy is less important. In these networks, inclusion of unofficial 
actors is an important principle. Still, governing officials often function as the public face 
of decisions or policies (Eshuis and Klijn, 2012). 
Another explanation is that unofficial actors benefit from information biases in 
news reports, which were clearly present. Many reports were fragmentized, dramatized, 
negative towards the project and demanded action by a governmental authority 
(authority-disorder bias); some were personalized. As discussed in the theoretical section, 
these information biases in the news can be judged differently. In line with Patterson 
(2000), Bennett (2009) and many others, we could argue that the complex policy process 
within the five water management cases are simplified and enlivened by information 
biases. Although news consumers are to some extent entertained by reading or viewing 
the news reports, we can at the same time question the extent to which they get really 
informed on the actual policy process. In contrast, we can also argue that the information 
biases are a sign of journalistic independence and even of democratization of the media 
debate, as Schudson (2009) and Shehata (2010) suggest. 
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Media attention for unofficial actors and non-governing officials, with generally 
fewer power resources in governance networks, shows significantly more information 
biases than news on governing officials. Information biases thus seem to make it easier 
for these non-authoritative groups to attract media attention to their side. We do not wish 
to make a definitive moral judgement on information biases, but these empirical results 
show that information biases function as a form of checks and balances. At least they 
provide checks and balances in media debates; but because media attention is a power 
resource in decision-making processes (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009; Sireau and Davis, 2007; Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten, 2010; Kunelius and 
Reunanen, 2011), information biases might similarly affect the policy process. 
In our water management cases, publicity indeed seems to have helped citizens to 
influence the decision-making process (van Buuren et al., 2010; A and B, 2012). In 
IJsseldelta-Zuid, for instance, a citizen group received much media attention for their 
protests against the building of new dwellings near their village. Consequently, the 
municipal council changed their decision in favour of the citizen group. The group clearly 
incorporated media logic in their strategies, organizing protests and dramatizing and 
personalizing their communication (A and B, 2012). Although agenda setting theory is 
often studied and applied in public administration, the role of media biases is often 
neglected in this literature on policy dynamics. It would be interesting to see more 
research on the role of information biases.  
With regard to information biases, we found in this study that these partly differ 
in the patterns of relationships with the actors. News reports are frequently fragmented, 
and this bias does not vary across the different groups of key subjects, as the other biases 
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do. The dramatization bias and negativity bias significantly relate to the media attention 
on unofficial actors and non-governing officials. Conflicts and negativity seem to make 
these actors – who lack the habitual access to the media enjoyed by officials – more 
newsworthy. Moreover, by organizing protests, contra-expertise and press releases (A 
and B, 2012), citizen groups provide journalists with information subsidies, which feed 
these two biases. Unofficial actors gain news value as well by incorporating the human 
angle in their story.  
Furthermore, claiming that there is need for authorities to act increases the 
attractiveness of their standpoint. However, it is not only non-governing officials that use 
this in their communication, governing officials also do this to some extent. This is 
actually the only bias for which the governors do not score significantly lower than 
unofficial actors. Possibly governing officials to some extent become influenced by the 
media debate, which is full of drama and negativity, and consequently also feel the need 
to plead for policy plans to be amended by their own departments or other governmental 
authorities.  
Our mainly optimistic conclusion should be tempered by the fact that we did not 
study exact qualitative content in this research. It should be borne in mind that, when an 
actor is coded as key subject of a news report, this does not necessarily mean that his/her 
perspective is correctly described in the story. According to the more pessimistic 
accounts of Bennett (2009) and Patterson (2000), his/her vision will often be simplified. 
Moreover, following this line of reasoning, we cannot and do not claim, on the basis of 
our results, that viewpoints of groups of actors are equally represented in the media 
debate. Probably, it is mainly unofficial and non-governing actors that are covered in 
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news reports because of their greater newsworthiness in terms of drama and conflict, and 
thus obviously information biases are more likely to feature.  
Nevertheless, we do not want to downplay the positive side of these information 
biases. The debate on policy plans can be enriched by issues raised by unofficial actors or 
non-governing officials in news reports and this can be partly attributed to information 
biases in news reporting.  
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Appendix 1 Conceptualization of the variables 
(This conceptualization can be found in Patterson, 2000: 24–6) 
Variable Definition Categories 
Personalization bias The use of the human interest frame. Human interest 
stories use a human example or put a ‘human face’ on 
an issue or problem, or go into the private or personal 
life of an actor and/or journalist, employing adjectives 
or personal vignettes that generate feelings of 
sympathy, empathy or outrage. 
-High human interest content 
-Moderate human interest content 
-Slight human interest content 
-No (or merely incidental) human 
interest content 
Dramatization bias Based on story, and the way story is presented, not on 
the topic of the story. 
 
-Substantial level of conflict 
-Some conflict (not merely incidental) 
-No conflict (or so slight as to be 
inconsequential) 
Fragmentization 
bias 
Episodic (story, not topic) mainly in the context of a 
particular event, incident; the story does not go much 
beyond that specific event; the story takes the form of 
a case-study). Thematic (story itself, not topic) mainly 
in a broader context that deals with its meaning or 
implications for society, a trend that goes beyond this 
single event/incident; story places public issues in a 
broad or abstract context 
-Episodic story 
-Thematic story 
Authority-disorder 
bias 
When the story implies a need for action or suggests 
action should be taken, the action frame is present. 
We combined this item with another code: the 
attribution of responsibility. When the story implies a 
need for action and the government is given the 
responsibility for that, the authority-disorder bias is 
present. 
Action/non action frame 
-Story implies/says there is an urgent need for 
action/describes a problem (and by direct statement 
or implication indicates the problem needs to be 
fixed); suggests action should be taken, would be 
desirable, etc. (can be public or personal action). 
-Story implies/says there is a non-urgent need for 
action/describes a problem (and by direct statement 
or implication indicates the problem needs to be 
fixed); suggests action should be taken, would be 
desirable, etc. (can be public or personal action). 
-Story describes action already taken or being taken 
to resolve the problem 
-No action component of note 
Attribution responsibility 
-Not applicable – coded 4 in previous code 
-Government/some level of government/a 
governmental institution or an individual public 
official (e.g. the president, mayor ) 
-A group, or collective, or community in society or 
a private institution 
-Private individual 
Negativity This code is designed to pick up whether the story is 
thought on the whole to be in the good news or bad 
news category. In some instances, it might be helpful 
to ask the following questions: If about a newsmaker 
and you were his/her press secretary, would you 
consider this a favourable or an unfavourable story? If 
about an institution (e.g. Congress), does this reflect 
favourably or unfavourably on the institution? If about 
a development (e.g. a social trend, event or incident) 
is this a good or bad thing for society?) 
For this research, we coded whether the report was 
favourable or unfavourable towards the water 
management project.  
-Clearly negative/unfavourable/bad news 
-More negative or unfavourable than positive or 
favourable 
-Balanced mix between negative and positive 
-More positive or favourable than negative or 
unfavourable 
-Clearly positive/favourable/good news 
-Neutral story, no positive or negative 
Most important 
actor in the report 
 Prime minister  
Minister 
Member of the lower house  
National government official 
The state 
Provincial governor 
Delegate from the provincial executive/councillor 
The province 
Metropolitan region 
Water authority  
Mayor 
Aldermen 
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Municipal councillor 
The municipality  
Inhabitants 
Farmers 
Environmental organizations  
Project organization 
Private investor 
Research institute  
Other 
 
